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Abstract
We examine optimal execution models that take into account both market mi-
crostructure impact and informational costs. Informational footprint is related to order
flow and is represented by the trader’s influence on the flow imbalance process, while
microstructure influence is captured by instantaneous price impact. We propose a
continuous-time stochastic control problem that balances between these two costs. In-
corporating order flow imbalance leads to the consideration of the current market state
and specifically whether one’s orders lean with or against the prevailing order flow,
key components often ignored by execution models in the literature. In particular, to
react to changing order flow, we endogenize the trading horizon T . After developing
the general indefinite-horizon formulation, we investigate several tractable approxima-
tions that sequentially optimize over price impact and over T . These approximations,
especially a dynamic version based on receding horizon control, are shown to be very
accurate and connect to the prevailing Almgren-Chriss framework. We also discuss
features of empirical order flow and links between our model and “Optimal Execution
Horizon” by Easley et al (Mathematical Finance, 2013).
Keywords: optimal execution, order flow, limit order books, information footprint
1 Introduction
The concept of optimal execution in financial markets is concerned with realizing the best
value for the asset traded via optimization with respect to the incurred trading costs.
These costs are driven by two fundamental components: market microstructure frictions
and informational asymmetries. Market microstructure implies that market liquidity is
finite and trades generate price impact. Informational costs reflect the fact that trades are
observed by other participants who will then adjust their own strategies and views of the
asset value and create adverse selection.
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The complexity of today’s market micro-structure has led to a wide variety of approaches
that focus on different facets of the problem. The seminal work of Almgren and Chriss
[3, 4, 5] originated the framework of diffusive mid-price models where trading is continuous
and price impact depends on the trading rate. Extensions of this model to account for
limit order book resiliency can be found in [1], and for other transient price impacts in [22].
Alternatively, focusing on trading via limit orders, [7, 12, 24] have investigated execution
under fill risk with discontinuous inventory trajectories. Hybrid models that mix limit and
market orders appear in [11, 25, 26].
The above approaches provide frameworks for modelling price impact and execution
costs but say nothing about informational costs. While there are some studies [28] that
analyze adverse selection, so far research in this direction has been mostly confined to
empirical studies of long-term (“permanent”) price impact. For example, Bouchaud et
al. [9, 8] and Farmer et al. [19] analyze the characteristics of order flow data, asserting
that order flow is predictable over time-scales of up to several days and that order flow
plays an important role in the formation of prices. A notable recent contribution is by
Easley at al. [17], who minimize a combination of information leakage and volatility risk
in a static setting. Importantly, [17] assert that the liquidity process is sensitive to the
execution strategy of the trader with the linkage through order flow. Specifically, the
theory of market toxicity [16] implies that the expected absolute imbalance in order flow
can be used to approximate the probability that a trade is information based. Therefore
one-sided markets are likely to create adverse selection and consequently in such toxic
conditions market makers widen the range at which they provide liquidity. A qualitatively
similar result was shown by Cartea et al. [12] where the market maker’s order placement
shifts deeper into the limit order book in response to one-sided market order flow. It follows
that by influencing the order flow, the trader’s actions create a transient impact on market
toxicity and hence execution costs.
In the present paper we bridge the above ideas within a combined dynamic model. We
maintain the basic features of the Almgren-Chriss setup, including continuous trading and
(quadratic) instantaneous price impact arising from market microstructure. However, we
also incorporate a novel stochastic factor (Yt) for order flow, which is similarly impacted
from executed trades. The transient impact on Y represents the informational footprint of
the trader and introduces a feedback loop into the problem. It allows the trader to react
to changing market conditions, in particular markets changing from being buy-driven to
ask-driven and vice versa. This order flow feedback is anecdotally incorporated in most
implemented practitioner algorithms and has been questioned in connection with liquidity
crises (notably the Flash Crash, see [27]). We use our model to examine the dynamic prob-
lem of Optimal Execution Horizon that was introduced in a 1-period version by Easley et
al. [17]. Thus, in contrast to Almgren-Chriss and typical execution models, we endogenize
the execution horizon which is optimally chosen depending on market liquidity. Intuitively,
trading should slow down when informational costs are high, and speed up when they are
low. From that point of view, rather than a pure optimization problem, optimal execution
is about trading-off price impact and information leakage against timing risk. Moreover, en-
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dogenizing execution horizon generates dynamic execution strategies even if the underlying
asset value is a martingale. This allows to obtain inherently adaptive trading in contrast to
deterministic strategies in popular models (e.g. [1, 4, 5]) that consider only price impact.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we setup our dynamic order
flow model and derive the associated HJB equation with endogenous horizon. In Section 3
we address the respective fixed horizon problem which allows us to obtain several closed-
form approximate strategies once we optimize over the execution horizon. The latter is
done in Section 4 where we also compare several strategies that result. Section 5 looks at
some stylized facts about order flow and discusses calibration.
2 The Optimal Execution Problem
The problem in view is liquidation of a position of size x = x0. We assume a continuous-
time setup, with trading taking place continuously and via infinitesimal amounts. Namely,
the trader trades x˙tdt shares at time t, so that his inventory xt follows the dynamics
dxt = x˙t dt. (1)
Execution ends at the random horizon
T0 := inf{t ≥ 0 : xt = 0},
whereupon inventory is exhausted. Throughout, time is supposed to be in traded-volume
units.
Beyond the inventory xt, the main state variable of our model is the order flow im-
balance Yt. The order flow imbalance captures the intrinsic fluctuations among supply
and demand for the security realized by the unequal amounts of buyer- and seller-initiated
orders and trades. On the short time-scale (intra-day to several days) it is empirically quasi-
stationary, in the sense that the observed volume is several orders of magnitude larger than
the deviations in net imbalance, cf. Section 5.1. Moreover it is highly noisy and appears
to be mean-reverting to zero. Therefore, we choose to model (Yt) in terms of a mean-zero
stationary process.
Let Y 0 represent the flow imbalance in the absence of the trader. As a starting point
we take (Y 0t ) to be an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with mean-reversion parameter β,
dY 0t = −βY 0t dt+ σ dWt. (2)
The mean-reversion strength β controls the time-scale of the memory in flow imbalance,
while the volatility σ controls the size of fluctuations in flow imbalance. Since imbalance is
intuitively in the range [−1, 1] (representing markets with 100% buyers, and 100% sellers
respectively), the fraction σ2/(2β), which is the stationary variance of Y 0, should be on the
order of σ2/(2β) ∈ [0.01, 0.2].
The execution program of the trader introduces a downward pressure on the order
imbalance process as a result of his selling. The information leaked by the trader’s action
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creates a drift in the realized order imbalance Yt, pushing it below Y
0
t . By displacing other
orders, the trader impacts expectations regarding future order flows and generates adverse
selection. A more precise description of this mechanism using (more realistic) discrete-time
setup and discrete trades is presented in Section 5.2. We postulate that
dYt = −βYtdt− φ(x˙t)dt+ σdWt, (3)
where φ(·) captures the information leakage. Observe that
Yt = Y
0
t +
∫ t
0
eβ(s−t)φ(x˙s) ds, (4)
so the execution program generates an exponentially decaying impact on Y 0. We assume
that φ : R+ → R+ is non-decreasing with φ(0) = 0. The three main cases we consider
are: φ(x˙t) ≡ 0 corresponding to zero informational footprint; φ(x˙t) = φt corresponding to
deterministic (but non-zero) impact; and proportional (linear) impact φ(x˙t) = ηx˙t. Linear
impact is computationally convenient, though not necessarily the most realistic reflection
of how a trader’s activity might influence expectations regarding order flow. Impact that
depends on the current value of the flow imbalance is investigated in Section 5.2.
The information leakage is “abstract” in the sense that it does not generate trading costs
per se. However, in line with [17] we assume that there are adverse selection costs associated
with trading in an unbalanced market. Here we assume that this cost is symmetric in Yt
(but note that agent’s actions induce only one-sided effects of Yt); for tractability we take it
quadratic. In addition, we carry through the two costs from Almgren-Chriss: instantaneous
impact g(x˙t) of trading at rate x˙t, and inventory cost λ(xt) for carrying a position of xt at
t.
The continuous-time execution problem is to minimize the sum of the corresponding
expected execution costs
inf
(xt)∈X (x)
Ex,y
[∫ T0
0
(
g(x˙s) + κY
2
s + λ(xs)
)
ds
]
, (5)
over admissible execution strategies (xt) ∈ X (x). The above expectation is conditional on
an initial value Y0 = y and initial inventory x which induce the measure Px,y. The horizon
T0 is part of the solution, so that the optimization is formally taking place on the whole
future s ∈ [0,∞). While the first term in (5) incentivizes the trader to slow down in order
to reduce his immediate liquidity costs, the next two terms of the cost functional are such
that under certain market conditions, it may be optimal to accelerate trading in order to
exit the market sooner.
Let Ft = σ(Ys : s ≤ t) denote the filtration generated by Y . Admissible strategies
(xt) ∈ X (x), consist of (Ft)-progressively measurable, absolutely continuous trajectories
t 7→ xt, such that x0 = x, limt→∞ xt = 0 and
∫∞
0 g(x˙s) ds < ∞ P-a.s. We also require the
following assumptions on the model ingredients:
• Instantaneous impact function g : R+ 7→ R+ is strictly convex;
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• The informational cost parameter κ ≥ 0;
• Inventory risk λ : R+ 7→ R+ is non-decreasing in x.
The cost functional in (5) is consistent with other approaches taken in the literature.
The assumption that g(x˙) is convex matches the empirical fact that market participants
like to divide a large “parent” order into smaller orders in order to reduce trading costs.
In limit order books (LOB), g(·) represents the depth of the LOB on the ask-side. If this
depth is constant, the instantaneous trading cost is quadratic g(x˙) = x˙2 (by rescaling κ and
λ we assume without loss of generality that the leading coefficient is 1). This assumption
also appears in [4, 11, 20] among others. Because our primary focus is on informational
costs, we assume for the moment that there are no other transient/permanent impacts on
the asset value St and further posit that strategies are independent of asset dynamics. In
Section 5.3 we return to this issue and discuss extensions that allow for positive correlation
between asset price dynamics (St) and order flow (Yt).
Our second cost term κY 2t is motivated primarily by the model presented in [17] and
captures the cost of information leakage. The main premise is that liquidity costs (e.g. like-
lihood of adverse selection) are higher in markets with unbalanced flow. However, unlike
[17], our model incorporates mean reversion and stochasticity in the flow imbalance process
(Yt). So the impact being modelled by this term is transient, and somewhat related to
models that investigate resiliency in the limit order book [1, 22]. For other papers that
considered stochastic execution costs see [3].
The last term λ(xt) in (5) represents timing risk, penalizing the trader for leaving his
position exposed to adverse price movements. Several risk terms have been applied within
the execution literature. The seminal work by Almgren and Chriss, which optimizes over a
mean-variance cost functional, reduces to a calculus of variations problem and the risk term
λ(x) = cx2. Gatheral and Schied [20] investigated a time-weighted value-at-risk measure
proportional to λ(x) = cx. In the context of timing risk, λ(x) = c generates costs that are
proportional to execution time which is a non-trivial modification once the horizon T0 is
not fixed.
Remark 1. In (5) we restrict our attention to pure selling strategies, so that xt is non-
increasing. As such all our cost functionals are only defined for positive selling rates.
Depending on the strength of information leakage, it is possible that the constraint x˙t ≥ 0
is binding, i.e. execution is suspended until market conditions improve. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to extend the framework to two-sided trading algorithms that raise the
issue of potential market manipulation [2, 22].
2.1 Execution Costs in Limit Order Books
Before proceeding with solving (5), we discuss the connections between our setup and trad-
ing in electronic LOB markets that currently dominate equity trading in US and Europe.
Trading in a LOB leaves a double footprint, both in space and in time. In space, an executed
sell order consumes the matching standing limit orders on the bid side. (In our framework
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since there is no fill risk all trades are assumed to be market orders.) This shortens the
respective queues on the bid side of the book and hence can move the best-bid. This is
the aforementioned price impact represented by g(x˙). Temporally, the executed order is
recorded by other participants on the exchange message ticker affecting the observed or-
der flow. The effect is both direct (the immediate fact that a sell order of x˙s shares was
executed), and indirect (the fact that market participants adjust their statistical view of
the order flow over time). Thus, to the extent that market participants monitor the ticker
(rather than just observe the snapshots of the LOB), an order generates informational foot-
print. There is a lot of anectodal evidence that many HFT algorithms indeed track the
time series of orders placed (for example to detect temporal trading patterns) and hence
will react to this footprint. This implies that information costs are at least as important
as instantaneous liquidity consumption.
Modelling order flow remains in its infancy. Indeed, while spatially the LOB can be
easily summarized as a collection of queues (modeled via say the depth function [1]), the
time series of the exchange ticker are much more complicated as market participants process
multiple streams of information. There are both executed trades (i.e. trades triggered from
market orders) and limit orders, which themselves can be added, cancelled, or modified
in other ways depending on the exchange. Orders further carry volume, time stamp and
possibly participant type (and limit orders can be entered at any level of the LOB). These
multi-dimensional data is moreover coupled in nontrivial ways, with temporal links both
within series (e.g. auto-correlation in the inter-order durations) and across series (e.g. exe-
cuted market orders tend to increase the arrival rate of limit orders at the touch). See for
example a recent model of Cartea et al. [12] who fitted cross-exciting Hawkes processes to
the basic order flow at the best-bid and best-ask queues. Given this challenges, our proposal
to model order flow by a Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is a compromise that will obviously
need more adjustments before calibration to actual data. In Section 5.1 we return to this
question with some empirical stylized facts about order flow.
Remark 2. In this paper we focus on the temporal order flow and its associated imbalance
that was conjectured by Easley et al. [15, 16, 17] to be related to market toxicity. Other
authors, such as [13], have used the terminology of order flow imbalance (or just order
imbalance) for a different object, namely “spatial” order imbalance. Namely, motivated
by queueing notation, they mean the net difference between standing limit orders at the
best-bid and best-ask. As shown by [13] and [14], order imbalance is predictive of the
next price move (i.e. correlated with the probability of the next price to be an up-tick or
a down-tick) and is closely monitored by most HFT algorithms. While the LOB depth is
related to the history of submitted limit orders, the relationship is highly complicated (due
to shifting mid-price, hidden orders, etc.). Consequently, our order flow imbalance is not
meant to be tied directly to the LOB depth or any immediate LOB properties, but rather
provide a temporal summary of recent orders submitted.
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2.2 HJB Formulation
To minimize (5) we adopt the standard stochastic control approach, utilizing the dynamic
programming principle and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) PDE. Within this framework
strategies are defined by their rate of selling, αt := −x˙t and the class of admissible strate-
gies A(x) consists of all nonnegative (Ft)-progressively measurable processes (αt)0≤t≤T0 for
which
xαt :=
(
x−
∫ t
0
αs ds
)
+
, 0 ≤ t,
belongs to X (x). The value function of our problem can be expressed as
v(x, y) = inf
(αt)∈A(x)
Ex,y
[∫ T0
0
(
g(αs) + κY
2
s + λ(x
α
s )
)
ds
]
. (6)
If it exists, we define the corresponding optimal strategy as α∗(x, y). For each path of
underlying Y 0t , α
∗ induces the realized execution horizon T0(x, y) = inf{t : xα∗t = 0} which
is a random variable taking values in [0,∞).
Standard arguments suggest that the value function v(x, y) will satisfy a Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation of the form
0 =
1
2
σ2vyy − βyvy + κy2 + λ(x) + inf
α≥0
{g(α)− αvx − φ(α)vy}, (7)
with the boundary condition v(0, y) = 0 for all y. We observe that (7) is a nonlinear
parabolic PDE in (x, y) for which the corresponding theory (e.g. regarding existence of
classical solutions) is rather limited.
For the remainder of the section we concentrate on the linear information leakage and
quadratic price impact case g(α) = α2, φ(α) = ηα. In that situation, the candidate
optimizer in feedback form is
α∗(x, y) =
vx + ηvy
2
. (8)
Substituting this feedback control into the PDE (7) we have
0 =
1
2
σ2vyy − βyvy + κy2 + λ(x)−
(
vx + ηvy
2
)2
. (9)
Due to the state dependence of the class of admissible strategies A(x), the problem
(6) is a finite-fuel control problem. As a result, there does not appear to be a tractable
closed form solution which satisfies the zero boundary condition along x = 0. In Appendix
A we illustrate a relatively straightforward method for solving (9) numerically via a finite
difference scheme.
To understand the feedback strategy in (8), we pause to consider the derivatives vx
and vy. As we will see, vx is always positive but vy can be either positive or negative.
Consequently, the candidate in (8) may fail to be non-negative.
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Lemma 1. The map x 7→ v(x, y) is strictly increasing for any y.
Proof. Fix x < x′ = x +  for a strictly positive  and consider an (-optimal) strategy α
for v(x′, y). Let Tx := inf{t : x′t = } be the random period to sell x shares using α. Then
by absolute continuity of t 7→ x′t, Tx < T0(x′, y). Moreover, α′(x, y) := αt(x′, y)1{t≤Tx} is
an admissible strategy for the initial conditions (x, y) since it liquidates exactly x′ −  = x
shares. Using the fact that α′ is sub-optimal for v(x, y) and that the second and third terms
in (5) are strictly positive almost surely, we find v(x, y) ≤ v(x′, y;α′) < v(x′, y).
In (9), the horizon is indefinite and ultimate liquidation is only modelled through the
boundary condition. Thus, understanding the realized execution horizon T0(x, y) is only
possible implicitly. Moreover, the nonlinearities in (9) make analysis intractable. To achieve
tractability we consider an approximate two-stage procedure. Thus, we first fix a horizon
T by imposing the constraint T0 = T . We then solve the resulting fixed-horizon problem
to find the best strategy α∗(T, x, y) and value function v(T, x, y). In the second step, we
optimize over T , to find the statically optimal horizon T ∗(x, y). Finally, we build the semi-
dynamic strategy α˜(xt, yt) = α
∗(T ∗(xt, yt), xt, yt). Thus, α˜ recomputes T ∗ as the state
variables (xt, yt) evolve and uses the corresponding static trading rate. This approach is
analogous to the receding-horizon setup in nonlinear control [29]. Indeed, the initial use
of α∗(T ∗(x, y), x, y) at t = 0 corresponds to model predictive control and α˜(xt, yt) then
continuously rolls the initial condition because of the stochastic fluctuations encountered.
The above plan is implemented in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. In the latter section we
also compare the execution trajectories and resulting costs from the various strategies.
3 Linear Quadratic Setup on Finite Horizon
Fix T <∞. We consider the analogue of (7) on [0, T ]. To avoid confusion we let u denote
the value function when defined on the fixed horizon:
u(T, x, y) = inf
(αt)∈A(T,x)
Ex,y
[∫ T
0
α2s + κY
2
s + λ(x
α
s ) ds
]
. (10)
For expository purposes, we use the time-to-maturity parametrization for u so that the first
argument T represents time until the deadline. Strategies on [0, T ] are defined in similar
fashion to those in Section 2 but with a constraint xT = 0 at the terminal time T . Forced
liquidation by T is achieved by leveling an infinite penalty if not completed, leading to a
singular initial condition of the form
lim
T↓0
u(T, x, y) =
{
0 if x = 0
+∞ if x 6= 0. (11)
Note that the second term in (10) continues accruing until the terminal time regardless
of whether the liquidation is completed earlier. Therefore, instead of the boundary condition
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v(0, y) = 0 we have (due to zero being absorbing for xt) u(t, 0, y) = E0,y[
∫ t
0 κ(Y
0
S )
2 ds]; see
Lemma 3 for explicit formula for the latter expression.
To obtain explicit solutions to (10), the next section treats the case in which φ is
independent of α over a fixed horizon. In other words, the trader may impact the order
flow process, but impact can be modelled in a deterministic fashion. Section 3.2 then
addresses the proportional footprint φ(α) = ηα case, still over fixed time horizon. It will
be shown that the strategies obtained in Sections 3.1-3.2 are not too suboptimal compared
to the indefinite-horizon model laid out in Section 2.
3.1 Myopic Execution Strategies
In classical optimal execution models [1], [4] and [5], optimal execution rates are deter-
ministic, i.e. αt is pre-determined. In this scenario, informational costs would also be
deterministic. Therefore, we examine the case where φ(α) is independent of α (but pos-
sibly depends on time t). Under that assumption, we can separate the two terms in (5)
since the dynamics of (Yt) are not directly affected by the trader; the performance criterion
simplifies to
inf
(xt)∈X (x)
(∫ T
0
x˙2s + λ(xs)ds
)
+
∫ T
0
κEy[Y 2s ]ds. (12)
Because (Yt) is independent of the control α, optimal strategies are defined only by the
first term in (12). Consequently, the resulting (αt) is independent of Yt and hence t 7→ x∗t
is deterministic. Thus, strategies based on (12) are myopic in the sense that they entirely
ignore the potential “footprint” left by the trader’s actions, instead focusing solely on
instantaneous cost and inventory risks. The following Lemma, proven in Appendix B
provides the solution to (12) for popular choices of inventory risk.
Lemma 2. Consider the calculus-of-variations problem of finding
I(T, x) := inf
(xt)
∫ T
0
(x˙2t + λ(xt)) dt
where the minimization is over all absolutely continuous curves t 7→ xt with x0 = x, xT = 0
and under the constraint that xt is non-increasing. Then the optimal “myopic” strategies
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(with αt ≡ −x˙t) are 
xMLt =
x(T − t)
T
;
αMLt =
x
T
;
IML(T, x) = x
2
T
,

if λ(x) = 0; (13)

xMHt =
x sinh(
√
c(T − t))
sinh(
√
cT )
;
αMHt =
√
cx cosh(
√
c(T − t))
sinh(
√
cT )
;
IMH(T, x) = √cx2 coth(√cT ),

if λ(x) = cx2; (14)

xMQt =
(
ct2
4
− t
(
cTˆ
4
+
x
Tˆ
)
+ x
)
1{t<Tˆ};
αMQt =
(
cTˆ
4
+
x
Tˆ
− ct
2
)
1{t<Tˆ};
IMQ(T, x) =
(
−c
2Tˆ 3
48
+
cTˆx
2
+
x2
Tˆ
)
;
where Tˆ := min(T,
2
√
x√
c
),

if λ(x) = cx. (15)
The superscripts ML,MQ,MH respectively stand for the Myopic Linear, Quadratic
and Hyperbolic models. The first case ML yields linear selling and the TWAP strategy,
or if time is parametrized in volume time, the classic VWAP trading strategy. The second
strategy xMHt and its corresponding rate α
MH
t represents exponential selling, and is the
optimal strategy presented in the original Almgren-Chriss model [4]. This risk term results
from the trader’s effort to minimize the variance of liquidation cost. From the perspective of
an inventory risk measure, one natural alternative is λ(xs) = cxs, which has the attractive
property of being proportional to value-at-risk and results in a selling strategy xMQt that
is quadratic in t. Yet as explained for a similar problem in [20], buying might result with
position size small relative to T . Imposing the constraint that xMQt is decreasing then leads
to the modified solution (15) which in the case Tˆ < T causes liquidation to end prior to
the terminal time T .
Figure 1 details the three execution curves described in Lemma 2 for x = 3 and T = 3.
Compared to the VWAP strategy xML, the non-zero inventory risk terms in strategies xMH
and xMQ lead to higher rates of selling initially. The execution rate in xMH is proportional
to x, cf. (14) and liquidation occurs exactly at T . In contrast, as xMQt becomes small, the
linear risk term cxMQt becomes more punitive and it may be optimal to end liquidation
10
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Figure 1: Optimal trajectories from Lemma 2. Figure drawn for initial inventory x = 3,
horizon T = 3, and c = 2. This leads to Tˆ = 2
√
x√
c
= 2.45 in the quadratic scenario xMQ of
(15).
prior to time T . Figure 1 shows inventory xMQt reaching 0 at time Tˆ =
√
6 as defined in
(15).
We now turn our attention to the expected execution costs which arise from the order
flow imbalance. Fixing (α∗t ), we can view the corresponding information impact φ(α∗t ) also
as a deterministic function of t, allowing direct evaluation of the second term in (12) using
the explicitly available Gaussian distribution of Yt.
Lemma 3. Given a deterministic, time-dependent flow impact φ(αt) = φt, and Y0 = y, Yt
has the second moment
Ey
[
Y 2t
]
= µ2t + σ
2
t , (16)
where 
µt = ye
−βt −
∫ t
0
e−β(t−s)φs ds,
σ2t =
σ2
2β
(1− e−2βt).
(17)
Lemma 3 can be verified by directly solving the SDE (3) and recalling the Gaussian
distribution of Yt.
Putting everything together we obtain the expected total cost for the family of myopic
execution strategies in Proposition 1. We reiterate that while realized costs instantaneously
depend on the stochastic process (Yt), strategies in this section are purely deterministic and
do not adapt to (Yt). The solutions below are labeled according to the form of λ(x); while
formally the two terms in (12) are decoupled, it is of course logical to match the resulting
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solution I of the instantaneous price-impact part with the corresponding expectation of
Ey[
∫ T
0 Y
2
s ds], which is the convention we follow in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Suppose that φt(α) = φt. The corresponding value function u is given by
uM (T, x, y) = I(T, x) +O(T, x, y), (18)
where I is defined in (13)-(15) and O = κ
∫ T
0
(µ2t + σ
2
t ) dt from Lemma 3 is
O0(T, x, y) = κy
2
2β
(
1− e−2βT
)
+
κσ2
4β2
(
2βT + e−2βT − 1
)
if φt ≡ 0; (19)
OML(T, x, y) = O0(T, x, y) + κηxy
β2T
(
2e−βT − 1− e−2βT
)
(20)
+
κη2x2
2β3T 2
(
2βT + 4e−βT − e−2βT − 3
)
if φt = ηα
ML
t
Closed form expressions are also available for OMQ and OMH , see Appendix C.
Thus, the overall cost of liquidation has two components: the I(T, x) term that depends
only on (T, x), and the informational footprint term O(T, x, y) that also depends on y.
In terms of x, O is constant if φt = 0, linear if φt = ηαML, and quadratic otherwise.
As a function of y, O is quadratic thanks to the linear dynamics of (Yt) and quadratic
informational cost. Financially, the y2 term represents higher costs due to trading in an
unbalanced market, while the y-term adjusts to the fact that selling in a market dominated
by buyers is favorable to competing with other sellers for scarce liquidity. The following
Corollary shows that the “best” level of y is positive (or 0 if φt = 0). Intuitively, it is
best to begin trading in an environment with positive order flow so that the trader’s selling
activity pushes the order imbalance towards 0 and reduces informational costs.
Corollary 1. Suppose that φt(α) = φt ≥ 0. Then the flow imbalance that minimizes
expected execution cost is non-negative, arg miny {u(T, x, y)} ≥ 0 for any T, x.
Proof. As already discussed, uM (T, x, y) is quadratic in y and the coefficient of y2 is always
as in (19). By inspection it is positive. The dependence on y comes from the O terms that
are of the form
O(T, x, y) = κ
∫ T
0
(ye−βt −At)2 + σ2t dt
where At ≥ 0 (strictly positive as soon as φt > 0 on an interval of positive measure,
cf. (40)). It follows that the coefficient of y2 in uM (T, x, y) is κ
∫ T
0 e
−2βtdt > 0 and of
y is − ∫ T0 2κe−βtAtdt ≤ 0. Thus, setting ∂yuM (T, x, y) = 0 and solving for y yields a
non-negative result.
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3.2 Dynamic Execution Strategies
We now return to the problem in (10), letting φ(αt) = ηαt. The optimal dynamic strategy
is adapted to the order flow imbalance process (Yt) and the trader’s rate of selling directly
influences (Yt). To avoid confusion we will denote dynamic strategies and expected costs
by αDt and u
D, respectively. The HJB PDE for uD(T, x, y) is
uDT =
1
2
σ2uDyy − βyuDy + κy2 + λ(x) + inf
α≥0
{
g(α)− αuDx − ηαuDy
}
, (21)
with uD(0, x, y) = +∞ unless x = 0. Note that (21) is identical to (6) but for the time
derivative on the left hand side of the equation which is introduced due to the time-
dependence arising from the constrained horizon T . Assuming g(α) = α2, λ(x) = cx2,
and inserting the feedback control as in (9) yields a semi-linear, parabolic PDE
uDT =
1
2
σ2uDyy − βyuDy + κy2 + cx2 −
(
uDx + ηu
D
y
2
)2
. (22)
with initial condition (11). To obtain (22), we let α be unconstrained and allowed to
become negative. This allows us to find the following candidate solution by exploiting the
linear-quadratic structure. The motivation comes from uM in Proposition 1 where we find
a similar result: quadratic in x and y with an xy term that adds additional costs when
y < 0.
Proposition 2. The solution of (22) has the form
uDH(T, x, y) = x2A(T ) + y2B(T ) + xyC(T ) + xD(T ) + yE(T ) + F (T ), (23)
where D(T ) = E(T ) ≡ 0, A,B,C, F solve the matrix Riccati ordinary differential equations
(ODEs) 
A′(T ) = −A2 − ηAC − η24 C2 + c
B′(T ) = −η2B2 −B(ηC + 2β) + κ− 14C2
C ′(T ) = −η2C2 − C(η2B +A+ β)− 2ηAB
F ′(T ) = σ2B,
(24)
and we have the following initial conditionslimT↓0A(T ) = +∞B(0) = C(0) = F (0) = 0. (25)
The optimal rate of liquidation is
αDHt (T − t, xt, Yt) =
xt(2A(T − t) + ηC(T − t)) + Yt(C(T − t) + 2ηB(T − t))
2
. (26)
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See Appendix D for proof of Proposition 2. We reiterate that in (24) A,B,C, F are
functions of time remaining and that we have simplified the notation by omitting the time
argument (i.e. A′ = A′(T ), etc.) on the right side of (24). Close to the deadline T , the
impact from impacting Y disappears, and (22) converges to the myopic linear case of (13).
This can be observed by formally linearizing the Riccati system (24) in the regime T − t = 
and using the initial conditions (25). We obtain the following expansions in :
A() = 1 +O()
B() = κ+O(2);
C() = −ηκ+O(2);
F () = σ
2κ2
2 +O(
3).
(27)
Inserting into (26) gives the short term trading rate αDH(, xt, Yt) =
xt
 + O(). This
heuristically confirms that the strategy (26) is admissible which can also be observed in
Figure 4 below: as t→ T , the dynamic trading rate stabilizes, resembling a VWAP strategy.
Remark 3. It is also possible to set-up and solve linear quadratic problems for other func-
tional forms of inventory risk λ(x). In the linear case λ(x) = cx, the resulting Riccati
system will have non-zero linear coefficients D(T ) and E(T ) of x and y. However, dynam-
ically satisfying the constraint x ≥ 0 is not tractable (cf. Tˆ in (13)) and we found that the
resulting unconstrained strategies tend to lead to wild buying-and-selling.
In the constant case λ(x) = c the Riccati system is almost the same as (24) (again
E(T ) = D(T ) ≡ 0) except that the c term moves to the fourth line: F ′DL(T ) = σ2B(T ) + c.
In the sequel we use both of these solutions for the numerical illustrations.
The equations in (24) can be dealt with using a software package such as R. It is however
necessary to replace the singular initial condition (11) with the condition
lim
T↓0
uD(T, Y, x) =
{
0 if x = 0
M if x 6= 0 (28)
for a constant M large, essentially allowing for a non-zero position at time T which must
then be liquidated in a single order at some additional cost. This is equivalent to introducing
a boundary layer [0, ] and solving on T ∈ [,∞] whereupon M = 1/ is the right choice
based on (27).
The optimal trading rate αD in (26) is linear in both xt and Yt. The former feature is
similar to the hyperbolic situation in (14) where αMHt is also linear in xt. We next illustrate
how the dynamic strategy αDt compares to its myopic counterpart α
M
t . With fixed terminal
time T , the incentive for the trader to speed up or slow down under strategy αDt arises
from the trader’s desire for more balanced order flow. Note that there is no incentive to
accelerate one’s trading in order to complete the task and exit the market prior to time T
since costs from Y accrue until T . For positive order flow imbalance, trading more quickly
in the present results in lower execution costs in the future because (Yt) will be closer to 0
as a result of his activity. Likewise, if order flow imbalance is negative, it is better to reduce
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trading speed so as not to pull (Yt) further from 0. For negative Y and large enough T
(or large enough κ, β), αDt may become negative (i.e. it may be optimal to begin buying),
however this happens only under extreme parameters.
Figure 2 illustrates the results of Proposition 2 for a simulated path of (Y 0t ) comparing
the myopic αMH versus the adaptive αDH . As can be observed, both strategies have a
broadly similar shape, with αD “fluctuating” around αMH . We also observe that αD is
less aggressive initially, starting out slower and then speeding up (relative to αMH) after
t > 1.5.
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Figure 2: Trading rates αDHt and α
MH
t for a sample simulated path of (Yt). The figure is
drawn for parameter values T = 3, κ = 10, σ = .14, β = .05, η = .05, λ(x) = 0.1x2, and
initial condition x0 = 3, Y0 = 0.
4 Optimizing Execution Horizon
We now move to the second step of the approximate solution scheme and remove the fixed
horizon constraint. Given u(T, x, y), define
T ∗ := arg min
T
u(T, x, y).
The next Lemma shows that T ∗ is finite in all the cases considered so far.
Lemma 4. For any fixed x, there exists T¯ such that ∂Tu(T, x, y) > 0 for all T > T¯ and all
y.
Proof. Recall that u = I +O, cf. (18). As T →∞, the variational problem (12) for I be-
comes independent of T . By inspection, limT→∞ IML(T, x) = 0 and limT→∞ IMH(T, x) =√
cx2. In the quadratic case, for T large enough, Tˆ = 2
√
x√
c
so that limT→∞ IMQ(T, x) =
15
4
3x
3/2√c for some function of the initial inventory. In contrast, O(T, x, y) = ∫ T0 µ2t + σ2t dt
grows at least linearly in T since limt→∞ σ2t =
σ2
2β . Also, the first term is non-negative and
it follows that ∂TO(T, x, y) ≥ σ22β asymptotically as T →∞ and for any y. Hence, ∂Tu > 0
for all T large enough.
Figure 3 illustrates Lemma 4 for the dynamic hyperbolic strategy with value function
uDH . We observe that uDH(T, x, y) appears to be convex in T with a unique global min-
imum T ∗(x, y). Moreover, T ∗(x, y) is largest for y ' 0 and smallest for negative y. This
matches the intuition that trading is slowest in balanced markets where informational costs
are large, and fastest in sell-driven markets where further information leakage is minimal.
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Figure 3: Expected execution cost uDH(T, x, y) as a function of T for different values of
order flow imbalance y. The dashed line indicate the value of T achieving the minimum.
Figure drawn for β = .05, σ = .14, η = .05, κ = 10, λ(x) = 0.1x2 and inventory x = 3.
Given initial (x, y) and corresponding T ∗(x, y), let αMt (T ∗, x, y) (and similarly αDt (T ∗, x, y))
be the resulting strategy over the fixed horizon [0, T ∗). This provides a static or open-loop
optimal execution strategy, since T ∗ is fixed and not adjusted as order flow Yt changes. We
can also construct a “dynamic” strategy by continually recomputing T ∗(xt, Yt) using the
latest datum (xt, Yt). We denote the latter as
α˜Mt (x, y) := α
M (T ∗(xt, yt), xt, yt)
with associated value function u˜M . The corresponding α˜D(x, y) and u˜D are defined in
similar fashion. The approach of “rolling” the horizon T ∗ as the underlying stochastic state
changes is known as receding horizon control or model predictive control, see e.g. [29].
Remark 4. Recomputing T ∗ can be done at any frequency. Namely, given a (stochastic) set
0 = t0 < t1 < . . ., one can construct the strategy α(T(t), xt, Yt) where T(t) := T
∗(xtk , Ytk)
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and tk = max{ti : ti < t}. For example, one can take tk = inf{t : xt ≤ (K−k)x/K}, giving
K rebalancing periods, during each of which 1/K of total inventory is liquidated.
Before moving forward we pause briefly to summarize the various strategies that have
been defined. The fully dynamic strategy which solves the original indefinite-horizon control
problem (7) in Section 2 is denoted α∗(x, y). In Section 3.1 we defined a family of myopic
strategies on a fixed horizon, generally denoted αM (T, x, y) and specific cases addressed in
Lemma 1. Continually optimizing T ∗ then yields the receding horizon strategy α˜M (x, y).
In Section 3.2 we introduced the dynamic strategy αD(T, x, y), which adapts to changing
flow imbalance over a fixed horizon, as well as the corresponding receding α˜D(x, y).
We proceed to compare execution cost statistics across the described strategies. For eas-
ier interpretation we consider the case of zero inventory penalization, λ(x) = c independent
of x, so that the benchmark strategy (without informational costs) is VWAP, i.e. constant
trading rate. The precise parameters were: timing risk λ(x) = c = .1 (i.e linear timing
costs), initial inventory and initial order flow imbalance x = 3 and y = 0 respectively,
η = .075, κ = 10, β = .05 and σ = .14. Against the original strategy α∗(x, y), we also
compare the adaptive α˜D and α˜ML. Both of these adjust the execution horizon by op-
timizing T in the fixed-horizon solution. Practically, this was achieved by discretizing in
time (∆t = .01) and recomputing T ∗(xt, Yt) at each time step, see Remark 4. Recall that
αMLt = xt/T
∗(t). To understand the frequency of above “rebalancing”, we also show results
for the strategy αMLt (T
∗
(2), x, y) which recomputes the horizon midway through the liquida-
tion process, when xt =
x
2 . The corresponding path of xt is therefore piecewise linear with
two pieces, see Figure 4. This is a convenient compromise in the VWAP setting and nicely
illustrates the advantage gained when the trader is allowed to adjust the execution horizon.
Finally, to understand the importance of adaptively adjusting T ∗, we also compare to the
static αDL(T ∗, x, y) and αML(T ∗, x, y) = x/T ∗(x, y).
Table 1 shows some summary statistics about the distribution of realized costs J(α) :=∫ T0
0
(
α2s + κY
2
s + c
)
ds. The results were produced with 2000 simulated paths of (Y 0t ). The
actual realized order flow imbalance paths for each strategy reflect the assumption that
φ(αt) = ηαt represents the true form of information leakage. Beyond the average expected
costs u(x, y) := Ex,y[J(α)], we also report the standard deviation SD and quantiles q· (at the
5% and 95% level) of J(α) which are important for risk-management perspective. Lastly,
we also report the average realized horizon E[T0]. Of course for non-adaptive strategies,
T0 ≡ T ∗(x, y) is constant. Comparing each α˜ to its respective fixed horizon counterpart
demonstrates the importance of utilizing “adaptive” execution horizon. Similarly, com-
paring respective myopic to dynamic strategies shows that the modelling of deterministic
information leakage in the former is not too suboptimal compared to the fully dynamic
proportional information leakage strategy of the latter. The cost improvements achieved
through optimizing the horizon tend to dominate those obtained through adopting a dy-
namic strategy in lieu of a myopic strategy.
Of particular interest is that the closed form solution computed for uML and resulting
strategy α˜MLt form a reasonable approximation for the difficult indefinite horizon setup
in (6) - (9). The cost improvement of the fully dynamic α∗ over VWAP strategy αML is
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Optimal Execution Strategy
v u˜D u˜ML uML(2) u
D uML
E[J(α)] 4.257 4.264 4.317 4.411 4.483 4.547
SD(J(α)) 1.50 1.45 1.39 1.49 1.77 1.84
q.05(J(α)) 2.70 2.76 2.83 2.96 3.11 3.12
q.95(J(α)) 7.33 7.28 7.10 7.50 8.19 8.42
E[T0] 3.87 3.70 3.48 3.44 3.43 3.43
Table 1: Statistics for six execution strategies including average realized cost J(α), standard
deviation, .05− and .95−quantiles of realized costs as well as average realized execution
horizon.
approximately 6.8%. This appears somewhat modest, but note that the latter strategy is
applied to the horizon [0, T ∗], which is the statically optimal horizon computed at t = 0
with the value function uML.
Figure 4 illustrates the various strategies for a sample simulated order flow imbalance
path (Y 0t ). The one-sided order flow in this particular simulation causes the “adaptive”
horizon strategies to accelerate trading and shorten the horizon relative to the fixed horizon
strategies.
4.1 Comparative Statics
Focusing on a single strategy, α˜DLt , we briefly discuss how adjusting the values for param-
eters c, η, and κ affect the trading rate and realized horizon. Increasing c corresponds to
lower tolerance for timing risk and intuitively leads to a shorter realized horizon and an
increase in trading rate across all values of y. Choices for κ and η depend respectively on
the trader’s assessment of the added cost of transacting when order flow is unbalanced and
exactly how susceptible one is to revealing information to other participants. Increasing κ
raises sensitivity to the order flow imbalance which leads to an increase in trading speed
and shortened execution horizon, particularly when (Y 2t ) moves away from 0. At the other
extreme, setting κ = 0 leads to the strategies addressed in Lemma 2 with zero informa-
tional cost. The effects of increasing η depend on the market state, increasing the trading
rate when order flow tilts towards buy orders and slowing when order flow is balanced or
sell orders dominate. Specifically, an increase in η means a stronger trade impact on the
order flow process, and thus it is beneficial in a buy market to tolerate somewhat higher
instantaneous costs because the trader can more efficiently capture the savings that result
from more balanced order flow in the future (and vice-versa in a sell-tilted market). Figure
5 illustrates these comparative statics for α˜DL in terms of κ and ν. Note that while theo-
retically αDL from (26) could be negative, in all our plots αDL remains far from zero and
well-behaved.
18
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
Tr
a
di
n
g 
 
R
a
te
 
 
α
t
αt
*
α~t
DL
α~t
ML
α(2)
ML
αt
DL
αML
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
1.
8
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
Time t
Or
de
r  
Fl
ow
 
 
Im
ba
lan
ce
 
 
(Y t0
)
−
0.
4
−
0.
2
0.
0
Figure 4: Comparison of trading rates (αt) for each of six strategies in Table 1 given the
shown simulated path of (Y 0t ) (The realized (Yt) depends on the strategy chosen). Note
that each strategy terminates at a different T0 indicated with a square.
4.2 Realized Execution Horizon
We now explore some features of the realized execution horizon T0(x, y) when following
the dynamic strategy α˜Dt (xt, Yt). The left panel of Figure 6 highlights the distribution of
T0(x, y) for different initial market states. We observe that T0 tends to be longest in a
balanced market. Indeed, in that case the trader pays the most attention on minimizing
his footprint and instantaneous execution costs, and therefore trades slowly. With positive
imbalance Yt > 0, he is incentivized to trade at a more rapid pace in order to bring the
market into a more balanced state. On the other hand, when a market is dominated by
sell orders Yt < 0, the trader finds himself competing for liquidity and trading occurs at
an even faster pace. The asymmetric effect of these effects creates a skew even with a
symmetric informational cost κy2. This phenomenon is further shown in the right panel
of Figure 6 that shows a scatterplot of T0 against terminal YT0 . It is also clear that the
issue is not only whether order flow is balanced versus unbalanced, rather the side of the
trade is very pertinent to the optimal strategy and realized horizon. Generally, imbalanced
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order flow results in higher trading costs and a shorter horizon, but clearly as one would
expect, trading against the prevailing order flow (selling when order flow is dominated by
buy orders) is preferable.
We remark that with T fixed, execution rate decreases with Yt in hopes that the order
flow process will revert to a more balanced state and the cost of liquidity will decline in the
future. However, allowing the horizon to be adjusted brings a new incentive for accelerating
execution in order to exit the market altogether and stop information leakage. This is a
phenomenon seen especially in times of panic or capitulation when minimizing the footprint
is less important than finding liquidity, even at greater cost.
We also observe a strong correlation between realized execution cost and realized execu-
tion horizon. Unbalanced order flow results in higher costs from the Y 2t term. In addition,
as lopsided order flow causes trading to accelerate, the trader also incurs higher costs from
the instantaneous cost term α2t . So costs tend to be lower for longer realized execution hori-
zon. Figure 7 provides another perspective on this feature by highlighting several specific
inventory trajectories and the corresponding realized order flow paths. It also shows that
the spread in realized horizon T0 is significant and can be up to 50% of the static T
∗.
4.3 Static Information Leakage
One of the motivations for the present analysis was the work of Easley et al. [17] (ELO),
who considered a related static optimal execution horizon model. Through the lens of our
setup, [17] treated the case where informational costs are measured only through YT rather
than through the integral term in (5). Specifically, ELO equated informational footprint
to the absolute value of the terminal flow imbalance |YT |. Also, ELO (implicitly) assumed
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a VWAP execution strategy on [0, T ] which is equivalent to taking zero inventory risk
λ(x) = 0 and instantaneous impact
∫ T
0 x˙s ds and translates to the myopic strategy α
ML of
constant trading rate. Finally, timing risk was modelled directly as Λ(T ) = c
√
T , motivated
by the same structural form for volatility of ST . The overall problem in [17] was therefore
min
T≥0
{
E[|Y αT |] + c
√
T
}
, αt = x/T. (29)
Our framework allows treatment of (29) in a dynamic setup, i.e. beyond the myopic strate-
gies and beyond a static optimization to obtain T ∗(x, y).
The possibility utilized in [17] to directly incorporate a timing cost of the form Λ(T ) can
be easily handled in more generality within (5) since the latter term makes no difference
to the fixed-horizon problems in Sections 3.1-3 and hence only shows up in the second-
step optimization over T . Based on numerical experiments, replacing running Y -costs
with a terminal cost ∝ Y 2T0 , tends to slow the optimal trading strategy in sell dominated
markets which allows the mean reversion in the order flow process to kick in and lower the
terminal cost. In the presence of positive order flow, the change in trading rate can be
in either direction depending on φ(α) and the trade-off between instantaneous costs and
informational costs.
5 Model Calibration
To implement the proposed execution strategies, the trader must observe the order flow
imbalance Yt. Moreover, they need to be able to calibrate the parameters of Yt. This
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requirement is different from typical execution strategies that operate in “open-loop” set-
tings, i.e. without any immediate input of market data. Of course, most empirical trading
is “closed-loop” and dynamically responds to market messages. In this section we briefly
discuss such calibration and translation of market information into model inputs.
5.1 Empirical Order Flow
We begin by focusing on executed orders, which from the flow point of view can be summa-
rized as a sequence V1, V2, . . . , where Vk is the signed market order volume (positive for buys
and negative for sells) for the security in question. We assume that trading is in volume
time, so there is no separate time-stamp component. A raw order flow would then be the
cumulative sum
∑
k Vk. Assuming that the participants focus on recent trades (i.e. market
memory is limited) leads to consideration of moving averages of Vk. By analogy to the
discussed Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics we therefore introduce the following exponentially
weighted moving average (EWMA) flow imbalance process (Ik) that is defined recursively
via
Ik+1 = e
−β|Vk|Ik + (1− e−β|Vk|) sign(Vk), (30)
22
where the memory parameter β is a proxy for the time-scale of market participants persis-
tency of beliefs about order flow. Intuitively, if all trades were of unit volume, we would have
Ik+1 = e
−βIk + (1− e−β sign(Vk); treating a single trade of |Vk| as that many unit-volume
trades leads to (30). We suggest that β = a/Vdaily where Vdaily is the average daily volume
and a ∈ [10, 100] is the intra-day mesoscopic time-scale of order flow. By construction,
Ik takes values in [−1, 1], with Ik = 0 representing a balanced market, and positive and
negative values of Ik representing a market tilted towards buying and selling respectively.
Figure 8 shows a typical daily path of Ik for two different values of β. To draw the Figure
we considered all executed Nasdaq ITCH trades between 9:40am and 3:55pm on a fixed
trading day and initialized I˜0 = I0 = 0 in the beginning (note that if one fully adheres to the
concept of moving averages, I0 should include flow from the previous day, but this is rather
problematic to properly implement). As expected, we observe a mean-reverting behavior
due to strong negative auto-correlation in Vk’s. The value of β controls the volatility of Ik.
Moving beyond (30) requires separate investigation beyond the scope of this paper.
Indeed, the modern limit order book messages are much richer than just a sequence of
signed volumes. There are issues of inter-trade durations, intra-day seasonality, and other
market information. Moreover, the data features can very significantly between more liquid
and less liquid names. Table 2 summarizes some basic details about order flow within a
given trading week across three representative equity tickers. We note that each day one
must process data for tens of thousands of executed trades, but in fact this is a tip of the
iceberg, since there are hundreds of thousands of other trades recorded in the LOB.
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Figure 8: The EWMA order flow imbalance metric for Teva Pharmaceutical (ticker: TEVA)
for a single day 5/3/2011. The data includes executed orders from NASDAQ, BATS and
Direct Edge exchanges which accounted for 2, 497, 623 of the 8, 059, 668 total traded shares
on the day. We also show the VPIN-like metric that used V = 25, 000 and n = 20 in (31)
and (32) respectively.
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Remark 5. While traditionally only executed trades were used to define order flow, in limit
order books this approach is questionable. Indeed, in the 2010s, market orders represent
less than 5% of total order flow, see Table 2. At the same time, as far as the snapshots
of the LOB queues and respective depths are concerned, limit orders that add/cancel at
the touch (highest bid/lowest ask price levels) are effectively equivalent to market orders.
Therefore, one probably ought to include such limit orders when computing Ik in (30).
Table 2 shows that the distribution of limit orders is markedly different from market orders,
with limit orders tending to be about 50% smaller on average. Limit orders deeper into
the books may also carry material information and could be considered (with a respective
weight depending on the corresponding depth level). The precise way to define order flow
is therefore ambiguous.
Daily Order Summary
MSFT TEVA BBBY
Volume 32, 748, 575 3, 809, 972 1, 222, 164
Executions # of Orders 26, 814 13, 811 8, 302
Avg trade size 1, 222 271 148
Limit Volume 271, 383, 713 25, 523, 228 13, 558, 498
Orders # of Orders 577, 164 182, 541 127, 362
at Touch Avg order size 469 139 107
Volume 675, 466, 734 98, 398, 817 70, 149, 547
Total # of Orders 1, 284, 524 542, 762 534, 557
Avg order size 526 181 132
Table 2: Summary daily statistics for LOB orders on the tickers MSFT (Microsoft), TEVA
(Teva Pharmaceutical) and BBBY (Blackberry) from NASDAQ, BATS BZX, EDGA and
EDGX exchanges. We report averages for the week (5 trading days) of 5/2/2011-5/6/2011.
An alternative way to define empirical order flow imbalance is based on bucketing. This
approach is more in line with a discrete model, such as the one in ELO [17] and indexes
flow by equally-sized volume slices rather than by individual trades. Namely, consider
(executed) volume slices of size V = V B` +V
S
` where (V
B
` ) and (V
S
` ) represent the buy and
sell volume respectively for the `-th slice. The bucket flow imbalance I˜` is
I˜` :=
V B` − V S`
V
= 2V B` − 1. (31)
Compared to (30), we have the link V ' 1/β to achieve same time-scale for (Ik) and
(I˜`). The difficulty with (31) is that order volumes are heavy-tailed and a large order
that spills over multiple volume buckets must be somehow handled. Moreover, I˜ in (31)
is intrinsically tied to the chosen bucket size V (See [6] and [18] for different arguments
regarding appropriate bucket sizes). Finally, as in (30), a decision must be made how to
include limit order messages when defining volume buckets and respective V B and V S .
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The defined Ik and I˜` are directly observed, and one could attempt to use them as the
basis for the flow process (Yt) used in the previous sections. According to [15, 16, 17, 18],
informational costs arise from order flow toxicity which is in turn tied to the participants’
beliefs about probability of adverse selection. Hence, translating past information contained
in I into Y requires making a judgement on how such beliefs about future order flows are
formed. It is commonly accepted that certain trades are influential or informative while
others have little to no impact on the market. With this in mind, it follows that a trade may
have little influence on a market maker’s expected flow imbalance even if the associated
trade volume Vk was large. Thus, the private information leaked to the market by a trade is
the product of numerous factors beyond trade size: spacing of successive orders, prevailing
market state, LOB shape, etc. Consequently, the exact relation between (Ik) and (Yt)
remains open. Further questions about the most relevant time scale or how the recent
history of observed order imbalance might influence the expected future order imbalance
are postponed to future empirical study.
Remark 6. In [18], ELO contend that order flow toxicity is linked to the level of “informed”
trading and can be approximated via the following VPIN metric based on (31),
VPIN` =
1
n
`−1∑
k=`−n
|I˜k|, (32)
where n, chosen along with bucket size V represents the window relevant for persistency of
order flow. Thus, VPIN is a moving average of observed values of I˜` for n latest volume
slices. According to ELO, VPIN is a good approximation to the market-makers’ expecta-
tions of the current imbalance VPIN` ≈ E|I˜`| and hence can be used as a proxy for Yt in
(29). In other words, the traders should act to minimize their impact on VPIN, which is
the expected absolute order flow imbalance. Because VPIN is directly based on observed
traded volumes, this also allows an explicit definition of trader’s informational impact, see
(34) below. ELO suggest to take V = Vdaily/50 and n = 50 which makes VPIN a daily
moving average of flow imbalance. This seems rather long and in Figure 8 we make n
smaller to focus on intra-day scale.
5.2 Discrete Time Formulation
Building on (31) and (32) one can construct a discrete model for optimal execution. This
involves reinterpreting the strategy α as a participation rate based on the observation that
an executed sell trade inherently affects the next bucket imbalance I˜` since it physically
displaces some of the other volume from that bucket. A discrete-time model also allows to
examine more general costs and model dynamics.
Fixing a volume bucket V , we assume that the trader chooses a participation rate αk
at each step, where
xk+1 = xk − αkV
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and k indexes trade volume. The trader’s participation influences the flow imbalance at
the next step via
Yk+1 = F (Yk, k+1)− φ(αk, Yk) (33)
where k+1 are independent random perturbations, F (y, ·) models the dynamics in Yk that
happen apart from the trader and φ(α, y) is the information leakage given previous im-
balance Yk = y. One motivation to generalize the leakage function is the trade influence
proposed in [17],
Yk+1 = ψ(αk)(Yk(1− αk)− αk) + (1− ψ(αk))Yk + k+1, (34)
where we still have αk ∈ [0, 1] and the function ψ ∈ [0, 1] is monotonic increasing. The
new expected order flow imbalance is a convex combination of two extreme outcomes: full
leakage according to ψ (first term) and no leakage (second term). (34) simplifies to
E[Yk+1] = Yk − αkψ(αk)(Yk + 1) =: Yk − φ(αk, Yk).
In analogue to Section 2, the trader’s goal is to minimize total expected costs until the
entire position has been liquidated,
v(x, y) := inf
α
Ex,y
[
T0−1∑
k=0
g(αk) + κY
2
k + λ(xk)
]
, T0 = min{k : xk = 0}. (35)
The control αk is constrained so that αk ∈ (0, 1] and is assumed to be in feedback form,
αk = α(xk, Yk).
The indefinite-horizon control problem (35) can be solved by introducing an auxiliary
“time” variable t such that execution stops after t steps (if it did not terminate already)
and remaining inventory at t incurs a terminal cost H(xt) = Ax
2
t (assuming immediate
one-step liquidation after t, cf. the VWAP strategy in (13)). This auxiliary problem has
value function v(t) defined in (36). As t → ∞, this execution horizon constraint vanishes
and we expect to recover the time-stationary solution v(x, y) of (35).
Using t as time-to-maturity, we have the discrete-time dynamic programming equations
v(0)(x, y) = H(x),
v(t)(x, y) = inf
α∈(0,1]
Ey
[
g(α) + κy2 + λ(x) + v(t−1)(x− αV, Y1)
]
(36)
where Y1 = Y
α
1 is defined by (33) and v
(t)(0, y) = 0∀y. The one-stage problem in (36) can be
readily solved using a Markov-chain approximation method by discretizing the state space
of Y and the bounded control space of α (which also makes the state space of xt discrete).
The above procedure allows arbitrary dynamics for (Yk) beyond (34) since one can always
use Monte Carlo or other methods to compute the transition density pY1(·|Y0 = y, α).
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5.3 Future Directions
An important aspect that is missing from the presented models is price risk. With a fixed
horizon, the assumption that the unperturbed asset price is a martingale makes realized
revenue only depend on execution risk. However, once the agent has the liberty to extend
the execution horizon, this is no longer the case and the trader could also chase higher
revenues. Explicit modeling of such objectives would necessarily increase the dimensionality
since another stochastic state variable, the (mid-)price St, must be added. Nevertheless,
under certain assumptions this more general setup could still be tractable. In particular,
one could maintain the linear-quadratic structure by adopting the assumptions of [21].
Gatheral and Schied [21] assume that S is described by a geometric Brownian motion and
inventory risk is measured by time-averaged value-at-risk (VAR), i.e. λt = λxtSt. Making
this adjustment in (5) leads to the problem of minimizing
uˇ(T, S, x, y) := ES,x,y
[∫ T
0
(
x˙2t + κY
2
t + λxtSt
)
dt
]
. (37)
Assuming linear information leakage and that S and Y have correlation ρ ∈ [−1, 1],
dW
(S)
t dW
(Y )
t = ρdt allows for a closed-form solution
uˇ(T, S, x, y) = x2Aˇ(T ) + y2Bˇ(T ) + xyCˇ(T ) + S2Dˇ(T ) + SxEˇ(T ) + SyFˇ (T ) + Gˇ(T )
where the coefficients Aˇ, . . . , solve yet again a Riccati ODE. Moreover, a fully closed form
solution is possible for strategies that are myopic with respect to Yt (see [20] for details).
As in Remark 3, the main difficulty is that an inventory risk that is linear in x cannot
guarantee xs ≥ 0 and hence is likely to include buying, making the optimization over T
delicate.
In the dynamic case the execution strategy is given by
αˇD(t, St, xt, yt) =
1
2
{
xt(2Aˇ(T−t)+ηCˇ(T−t))+Yt(Cˇ(T−t)+2ηBˇ(T−t))+St(Eˇ(T−t)+ηFˇ (T−t))
}
and is therefore linear in price St. (The myopic strategy is also linear in St). Note that
only the execution cost uˇ is impacted by ρ, while the strategies themselves are independent
of the correlation between asset prices and order flow. In reality, the joint behavior of
order flow and asset prices remains poorly understood. In fact, the positive correlation
between market-order flow and asset price is a direct indication of adverse selection affecting
liquidity providers, see e.g. the very recent preprint [10]. Further investigation into how the
co-movement of order flow and asset prices might affect execution costs seems warranted.
Another piece that could be potentially added is LOB resiliency, i.e. the intermediate
effect of consuming liquidity which temporarily moves the execution price. As already
explained, it is analytically quite similar to the modeled impact on Y , but instead operates
directly on S. Resiliency allows to separate the temporary impact on the LOB that does not
increase toxicity with the “permanent” impact on Y that changes participant expectations
of future flow and generates informational footprint.
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A Finite Difference Approach to (9)
We employ an explicit finite difference scheme to find an approximate solution to (9).
Denote vi,j := v(xi, yj), where xi = i∆x for i = 0, 1, . . . , N and yj = y0 + j∆y for j =
0, 1, . . . ,M . Derivatives of v are approximated as
∂
∂x
v(xi, yj) =
vi+1,j − vi,j
∆x
;
∂
∂y
v(xi, yj) =
vi,j+1 − vi,j−1
2∆y
;
∂2
∂y2
v(xi, yj) =
vi,j+1 − 2vi,j + vi,j−1
(∆y)2
,
and we apply the boundary condition v(0, y) = v0,j = 0∀j. In y we use the boundary
conditions for vi,0 and vi,M via
∂2v(xi,y1)
∂y2
=
∂2v(xi,yM−1)
∂y2
= 0 and choose y0 and yM such that
P((Yt) /∈ [y0, yM ]) ≈ 0. Substituting into (9) we have
0 =
1
2
σ2
∂2vi,j
∂y2
− βyj ∂vi,j
∂y
+ κy2j + λ(xi)−
1
4
(
∂vi,j
∂x
+ η
∂vi,j
∂y
)2
and rearranging terms yields
vi+1,j = vi,j
+∆x
(
2
(
κy2j + λ(xi)− βyj
vi,j+1 − vi,j−1
2∆y
+
σ2
2
vi,j+1 − 2vi,j + vi,j−1
(∆y)2
)1/2
− ηvi,j+1 − vi,j−1
2∆y
)
.
So we have a so called “time-marching” scheme in x, where v at each inventory level
i + 1 can be approximated by values from the previous inventory level i. This explicit
approach is available for appropriate parameter values in which α∗ > 0 holds. For more
extreme parameter values we may have α∗ = 0 (recall that we constrain α∗ ≥ 0). In this
case our explicit method would fail for certain grid points and it would be necessary to
utilize an alternative method.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We skip the trivial case λ(x) = 0. See [23] for details when λ(x) = cx2. For
λ(x) = cx, when x is unconstrained, the problem is a straightforward application of the
Euler-Lagrange equation. For cost functional F (x, x˙, t) = x˙2s + cxs, the optimal trajectory
xMQt must satisfy (
dF
dx
− d
dt
dF
dx˙
)
= 0 (38)
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Applying the constraint that x is decreasing introduces the boundary condition at x = 0.
Then the optimal trajectory for the constrained minimization problem either lies on the
curve which satisfies the Euler-Lagrange equation or lies along the boundary, with the
transition from the former to the latter occurring where xMQt is tangent to the line x = 0. In
order to find the point at which this transition takes place, we find T ′ such that dx
∗
t
dt
∣∣
t=T ′ = 0.
It is easily verified that T ′ = 2
√
x√
c
satisfies the requirement and so we have Tˆ = min(T, 2
√
x√
c
).
Having computed xMt for each choice inventory risk term, α
M
t and IM are computed
respectively by differentiating with respect to t and integrating over the interval [0, T ] ([0, Tˆ ]
for IMQ).
C Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. An application of Fubini’s theorem, permits the interchange of expectation and in-
tegration leaving us with a straight-forward but lengthy integral computation. The general
expression for O is
O(T, x, y) =
∫ T
0
(ye−βt −At)2 + σ
2
2β
(1− e−2βt)dt (39)
where
At :=
∫ t
0
e−β(t−s)φsds (40)
captures all the information leakage. Integrating the other two terms gives
O0(T, x, y) = κ
∫ T
0
(ye−βt)2 + σ2t dt
=
κy2
2β
(
1− e−2βT
)
+
κσ2
4β2
(
2βT + e−2βT − 1
)
.
Computing the integral for the remaining three cases is straight-forward but tedious. We
provide the values of At for each case. For φt = ηα
ML
t , we have A
ML
t =
ηx
βT (1 − e−βt).
When φt = ηα
MQ
t we have
AMQt = η
∫ t
0
(
cTˆ
4
+
x
Tˆ
− ct
2
)
e−β(t−s) ds
=
η
β2
(
c(1− βt+ e−βt) + β(1− e−βt)
(
cTˆ
4
+
x
Tˆ
))
.
Lastly, when φt = ηα
MH
t and
√
c 6= β, we have
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AMHt = η
∫ t
0
√
cx cosh(
√
c(T − s))
sinh(
√
cT )
e−β(t−s) ds
=
η
√
cx
(c− β2) sinh(√cT )(λ sinh(
√
c(T − t)) +√ce−βt sinh(√cT )
− β cosh(√c(T − t)) + βe−βt cosh(√cT )).
If
√
c = β then the final expression simplifies to
AMH
′
t =
ηxe−βte−βT
(
2βte2βT + e2βt − 1)
4β sinh(βT )
.
One can finally integrate (using a symbolic integration software for example) (39) over
t ∈ [0, T ] to obtain closed-form expressions for OMQ and OMH . The resulting formulas
which take several lines are available on request from the authors.
D Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Substituting (23) into the HJB PDE (22) we have
uDT = σ
2B(T ) + κy2 + c2x2 − βy(2yB(T ) + xC(T ))−
(
2xA(T ) + yC(T ) + η(2yB(T ) + xC(T ))
2
)2
= x2
(
c2 − (A(T ))2 − ηA(T )C(T )− (ηC(T ))2)
+ y2
(
κ− 2βB(T )−
(
C(T )
2
)2
− ηB(T )C(T )− (ηB(T ))2
)
+ xy
(
−βC(T )−A(T )C(T )− 2ηA(T )B(T )− η(C(T ))
2
2
− η2B(T )C(T )
)
+ σ2B(T ).
On the other hand, uDT = x
2A′(T )+y2B′(T )+xyC ′(T )+xD′(T )+yE′(T )+F ′(T ). Matching
the appropriate powers of x, y on either side of the equality yields the system of Riccati
differential equations (24), with the boundary conditions (11) translating into (25). As
previously mentioned, the first order terms D(T ) and E(T ) in x and y are not required if
the inventory risk term is of order x2 or 1.
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